

ARTICLE APPEARED  
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# Beirut Bombing: Myster

## Warriors Traced to Syri

*This is the first of a series of reports on terrorism written and reported by Washington Post staff writers Bob Woodward, Richard Harwood and Christian Williams.*

Three days before a bomb blast killed 241 American servicemen at the Beirut airport Oct. 23, a Lebanese financial emissary named Hassan Hamiz was given a check or voucher for approximately \$50,000 that could be cashed only at the Iranian embassies in Beirut or Damascus, according to reliable intelligence reports. The reports indicate that, after the bombing, it was cashed at the embassy in Damascus, where Hamiz, described as a "fixer" with high-level contacts, had very close relations with

Iranian Ambassador Ali Akbar Mohtashami, who has been identified by the CIA as a key figure in Middle East terrorism.

The \$50,000 payment is believed to be a primary link in the financing that set in motion two fanatical suicide truck-bomb attacks that destroyed the U.S. Marine emplacement and also killed 58 soldiers at the French military headquarters in Beirut that same October morning, according to a review of intelligence documents and interviews with officials in the United States, Middle East and Europe.

Investigations by the CIA and French, Israeli and Lebanese intelligence services have pieced together many of the essential

details of the devastation of Oct. 23, perpetrated by men who crave death as soldiers of their God and planned by others who rely on the terror factor as the most

effective brand of political warfare. The events that ended with the blood and rubble of that massive explosion included a complex series of transactions, codenames,

meetings in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and Damascus, and trucks moving explosives under cover as rice transports.

In addition to Hamiz, 13 individuals now have been tied to the bombings by the intelligence services. They include a Syrian

## THE TERROR FACTOR

### Part I

intelligence colonel, a former PLO security officer, Syrian members of the Syrian-controlled Saiqa (Thunderbolt) Palestinian terrorist organization, a relative of the Shi'ite Moslem leader in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, an Islamic fundamentalist clergyman from Beirut and several veterans of other terrorist operations. Among them are:

- The Syrian intelligence officer, identified by various intelligence organizations

as Lt. Col. Diyab (also spelled Diab), has been traced to a planning meeting Oct. 21 or 22, just before the Marine bombing. Surveillance reports show that he was in the southern suburbs of Beirut and was planning an attack against French and American installations.

- A key architect of the operation, according to Israeli intelligence, is identified as Nablan Shaykh, a former deputy chief of national security for the Palestine Liberation Organization. He operated under the code name Abu Kifah and had been in charge of security in a west Beirut neighborhood at the Museum Crossing on the

line dividing Christian eastern and Moslem western Beirut.

- Two other Syrian officials in Saiqa, a PLO organization founded and controlled by the Syrian military, attended meetings on Oct. 21 and 22 and discussed a strike against the multinational forces in Beirut.

One Saiqa member, Ahmed Halaq, is identified in intelligence reports as a specialist in assassinations. He had been in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, a Syrian-controlled area about 30 miles east of Beirut

controlled Bekaa Valley, visited Beirut several days before Oct. 23 and was involved in obtaining the pickup trucks used in the bombing. According to intelligence reports, he heads what is called the Hussein Suicide Commandos, and intelligence reports say that immediately before or right after Oct. 23 he claimed he was going to report the outcome of the planned operations to his cousin Hussein Musawi, in the Bekaa Valley. Hamiz, the Lebanese financial emissary who cashed the \$50,000 check after the bombing, is also close to Hussein Musawi, the reports indicate.

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# Ex-CIA Chiefs Fault Marine Role

By David Hoffman  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Three former directors of the CIA yesterday faulted the role of U.S. Marines in the multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon and suggested that they should be moved from their positions at the Beirut International Airport.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, CIA director under President Jimmy Carter, James R. Schlesinger, who held the post briefly under President Richard M. Nixon, and William E. Colby, CIA director under Nixon and President Gerald R. Ford, echoed the growing restiveness in Congress about the Marines' presence in Lebanon.

"I think the Marines are not on a mission which is a Marine mission at the moment," Colby said in a joint interview with Turner on "Meet the Press" (NBC, WRC). "You should not send superpower forces to a peace-keeping mission. The Marines are not a peace-keeping force."

Colby said that if the United States intends to support the government of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, "We should be doing it with a military aid system and advisers and not with Marines."

Speaking on "This Week With David Brinkley" (ABC, WJLA), Schlesinger said that unless the United States is prepared to change the "balance of forces in the region," then the other option is to withdraw.

"The worst of all policies is probably simply to hang in there, because under those circumstances the cost to the United States will rise. It is probably a blunder to have gotten in," Schlesinger said.

President Reagan is under growing pressure from members of Congress and senior military officials to reexamine the role of U.S. forces in Lebanon and possibly pull them out. Reagan is said to be "adamant" in his opposition to withdrawal, but administration officials, with Congress scheduled to return Jan. 23, are planning to intensify their dis-

cussions about Lebanon this week after Reagan returns from his California vacation.

Rep. Nicholas Mavroules (D-Mass.), a member of the House Armed Services subcommittee that issued a report critical of security measures in effect before the Oct. 23 Beirut terrorist bombing that killed 241 U.S. servicemen, predicted yesterday that Reagan will face "many initiatives" seeking to pressure him to redeploy or withdraw the Marines

when Congress returns. Democratic presidential candidate Walter F. Mondale called over the weekend for an immediate withdrawal of the Marines. Many Democrats on Capitol Hill, including Mavroules and House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.), supported a War Powers Resolution compromise with Reagan allowing the Marines to stay for up to 18 months, but have begun to express doubts about the compromise since the Beirut attack.

Both Turner and Colby suggested that some U.S. presence be maintained in Lebanon. Turner said Reagan could use "an option for pulling out gracefully" by redeploying the Marines to ships offshore, rotating some back to the airport—an option the White House has ruled out in

recent days. Colby suggested that Reagan "step up" U.S. training of the Lebanese army, "so we can show that we're not withdrawing entirely."

Last week, a special Pentagon commission investigating the Beirut bombing criticized U.S. cutbacks in so-called "human" intelligence-gathering capability, as compared to that using technology such as satellites, and presidential spokesman Larry Speakes faulted the Carter administration for these cutbacks.

Turner said the Carter administration had "cut some of the fluff out" of the CIA, for example, but denied that the human intelligence-gathering capability had been weakened.

Yesterday, one member of the commission, former undersecretary of the Navy Robert Murray, said he believes that "there was never a great possibility of courts-martial, at least a successful prosecution, because of the enormous extenuating circumstances."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-2

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# Turner defends Carter on spy cutback charges

BY A WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF WRITER

White House charges that Carter administration cutbacks contributed to the intelligence-gathering failures in connection with the Beirut bombing are a desperate, cheap shot, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency said.

"It's the height of bad manners" and indicates "how desperate the White House is" to pass on the responsibility for the Lebanon situation to another party, said retired Adm. Stansfield Turner, CIA director in the Carter administration.

"You've got a real effort here by the president to pass the blame," the admiral told The Washington Times in a telephone interview.

"It's a pretty cheap shot," he said, if the Reagan administration is saying that what was done more than three years ago in reducing the size of the CIA contributed to the Oct. 23 suicide bombing of the Marine headquarters, which killed 241.

"They've had three years to correct what was wrong," he said, referring to remarks made last week by White House spokesman Larry Speakes. Mr. Speakes was quoted last week as saying: "We don't quarrel with the fact that the CIA and other intelligence-gathering agencies have been crippled by decisions of the previous administration, and we are in the process of rebuilding capabilities. But, it takes time to re-establish our intelligence-gathering methods."

He made this comment after the release of a report by a Pentagon commission investigating the Beirut bombing.

Headed by retired Adm. Robert L.J. Long, the commission found the Marine commander in Lebanon did not have effective "U.S. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) support" i.e., spies, as opposed to reconnaissance planes and satellites.

"The paucity of U. S. controlled HUMINT is partly due to U. S. policy decisions to reduce HUMINT collection worldwide. . . . The lesson of Beirut is that we must have better HUMINT to support military planning and oper-

ations," the Long Commission report said.

Adm. Turner said that any cutback in the number of U.S.-controlled spies has resulted more from Reagan administration mishandling of the CIA than any staff reductions made during the Carter administration.

The admiral accused the Reagan administration of cutting down on the number of spies worldwide by diverting men and resources to covert activities in Central America against the Marxist Sandinista government in Nicaragua, activities which he opposes.

In the last 18 months, the admiral said, the White House has diverted "much of the intelligence activity away from intelligence-gathering to covert action."

He further explained that the cuts in the size of the CIA staff made during the Carter administration were only a continuation of those begun in the previous administration by George Bush. The vice president was CIA director under President Jerry Ford.

The admiral said that when he took over in 1977 as director of central intelligence on his desk was a recommendation from Mr. Bush that the agency be cut by 1,300 jobs as a continuation of a reduction begun after the Vietnam build-up. No comment could be obtained from Vice President Bush.

After further review, Adm. Turner said this recommendation was reduced to a cut of only 820 jobs. Because of normal job attrition, only 247 people were affected one way or the other, with only eight being fired outright.

The admiral said that he agreed the CIA was "overstaffed" after the Vietnam conflict ended, and that the agency needed to be "pared down to a manageable size."

But, he added, it's a "very superficial measure" to say that fewer people means less of an intelligence capability. The reductions under his watch, the admiral insisted, were made mainly in the area of overhead, and resulted "in fewer people not fewer spies."

— Walter Andrews